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 Abstract: 
This paper examines factors that promote and hinder regional cooperation 
against terrorism. The paper argues that counter-terror cooperation in the 
region is internally driven. The paper gives a particular focus to the People’s 
Republic of China, Indonesia and Malaysia. Domestic political and economic 
concerns strongly influence counter-terror policies of these countries. 
Differences in attitude towards counter-terrorism cooperation between 
Malaysia and Indonesia are best explained by their different domestic political 
dynamics. The domestic balance of power between political parties and 
bureaucratic politics exerted positive influence in Malaysia while they 
influenced negatively in Indonesia.  
 
 
Terrorism is a transnational threat that cannot be effectively addressed by one state 
alone. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 
September 2001 proved that even a world’s superpower whose military power is 
unrivaled cannot prevent terrorism. Fighting against terrorism also requires long-drawn 
international and regional efforts as the United States and its allies have not yet captured 
the mastermind of the September 11, Osama bin Laden. While the September 11 did not 
completely transform international relations nor did it make traditional security 
challenges obsolete or trivial, it is a widely held view today that “terrorism is destined 
to be a centerpiece [sic] of the field of international security studies” for the foreseeable 
future.1 
The central objective of this chapter is two-fold. First is to assess the progress of 
counter-terrorism cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The second purpose is to 
examine why the region is making the progress it is making. The assessment reveals 
that domestic political considerations are driving forces behind the current status of 
regional counter-terror cooperation. The descriptive section on regional cooperation will 
highlight differences in states’ eagerness for clamping down on terrorism despite similar 
ethnic and religious demographics. Such differences can be best explained by 
examining their domestic political situations. An analysis of terrorism in the region and 
counter-terror measures is first in order. 
 
Terrorism in East Asia 
Terrorism has existed in East Asia for many years. During the Cold War, various 
internal insurgent groups arguably constituted the most significant internal threat to the 
states in Southeast Asia.2 Currently, Asia is suffering from the highest incidence of 
terrorist attacks in the world. According to U.S. Department of State, Asia marked the 
highest number of terrorist attacks (ninety-nine) in 2002 and had the highest number of 
casualties with 1,281, almost half the world’s total casualties.3 The threat of terror is 
most prominent in Southeast Asia as evidenced by the Bali bombing and the Marriott 
Hotel bombing in Jakarta in October 2002 and August 2003 respectively. These blasts 
were believed to be perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the regional terrorist network 
that penetrates in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. In addition to JI, 
there are several terrorist groups in this sub-region including the Laskar Jihad, the Abu 
Sayyaf, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) the New People’s Army (NPA) and the Kumpulan Mujaheddin Malaysia 
(KMM), to name a few. Northeast Asian countries are not immune to threats posed by 
these terrorist groups in Southeast Asia as many Chinese, Japanese, Korean and 
Taiwanese corporations invest in Southeast Asian countries. 
After the fall of the Taliban regime, Southeast Asia has been identified as the second 
front of the American global war against terrorism. U.S. Department of State named 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines as “potential al-Qaeda hubs.”4 U.S. Deputy 
Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz warned with specific reference to Indonesia: “you 
see the potential for Muslim extremists, Muslim terrorists to link up with those Muslim 
groups in Indonesia and find a little corner for themselves in a country that’s otherwise 
actually quite unfriendly to terrorism.” 5  While Southeast Asia should not be 
characterised as ‘the second front’ of the American global campaign against terrorism 
and an analogy should not be drawn between Afghanistan and Southeast Asia,6 the 
most serious threat facing Southeast Asia today is terrorism, as the links between 
al-Qaeda and several terrorist groups in this sub-region are evident.7 
While the threat of terror is not so eminent as in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asian 
states too are confronted with terrorism. In the 1970s, the Japanese government, for 
example, faced a threat from the Japanese Red Army which cooperates with the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In 1995 a Japanese religious cult group 
Aum Shinrikyo staged an infamous sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, 
causing massive disruption and widespread fear among the Japanese. The Aum 
Shinrikyo is an international terrorist group active also in Russia and elsewhere, having 
approximately 40,000 to 60,000 members worldwide in 1995. 8  The cult clearly 
represented a case in which weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) proliferated to 
non-state actors.9 The DPRK is named a state sponsor of terrorism by the United States 
not only because it sells advanced missile technology to other terrorists-sponsor states 
such as Iran, Libya and Syria, but also because it provides sanctuary to a small group of 
Japanese Red Army members or the Yodo-go group who hijacked a JAL airliner to 
North Korea in 1970. 
Multilateral cooperation is indispensable to fight against international terrorism. 
While some terrorist groups are homegrown and operate within their national 
boundaries, others such as JI and the Aum Shinrikyo operate beyond borders. For this 
reason, no state is capable of clamping down international terrorism alone. Multilateral 
cooperation is preferable to bilateral one, though the latter is equally important to the 
former, simply because terrorist networks permeate into more than two countries, as 
some already have done so in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
Defining Terrorism 
There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism in the relevant literature. 
Terrorism means differently to different observers and consequently the definition 
differs from one to another. To give an example, in the United States, the State 
Department, the Defence Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have their own definition of terrorism.  
As far as this study is concerned, however, one thing is clear: that the definition 
must be acceptable to states in East Asia. Some states in the region are averse to 
Western conceptualization and its way of doing. In this context, terrorism needs to be 
defined in East Asian way. There are, to date, two East Asian definitions of terrorism. 
The first definition is found in the Agreement on Information Exchange and 
Establishment of Communication Procedures, which is signed by Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Cambodia and Thailand. The agreement reads, 
 
Any act of violence or threat thereof perpetrated to carry out within the 
respective territories of the Parties or in the border area of any of the Parties an 
individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or 
threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or 
rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property 
to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, 
or international facilities, of threatening the stability, territorial integrity, 
political unity or sovereignty of independent States.10 
 
One fundamental problem with this definition, however, is its obscurity. As Rommel 
Banlaoi points out, this definition “fails to make a clear demarcation line between an 
ordinary criminal act and a terrorist act.”11 
The other definition of terrorism is offered by the Council for Security Cooperation 
in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), which conceptualises terrorism as 
 
The use of violence, often against people not directly involved in a conflict, by 
parties which generally claim to have high political or religious purposes, and 
believe that creating a climate of terror will assist attainment of their 
objectives. Terrorism of this kind almost always appears to be 
non-governmental, but terrorism can also be conducted by states. Movements 
engaging in terrorism may also have a degree of clandestine support from 
governments.12  
 
This study employs the CSCAP’s definition because not only it is conceptually clearer 
than the definition of the Agreement, but also a likely official definition to be adopted, 
should regional countries decide to do so, will be either the same or similar to the one 
defined by CSCAP, as was the case with preventive diplomacy. 
 
Counter-Terrorism Measures 
CSCAP’s Report on International Terrorism provides an excellent starting point in 
formulating regional measures to combat terrorism.13 Since terrorism is a complicated, 
multi-faceted phenomenon, CSCAP puts forth a comprehensive counter-terrorism 
strategy, which stresses to grasp two aspects of terrorism: its root causes and its 
technological complexity. In regards to the former, CSCAP considers two factors as the 
root causes of terrorism, namely ideological and socio-economic factors. The 
ideological factor refers to religious and ethno-nationalistic extremism whereas the 
socio-economic factor includes poverty and unemployment, which results from poor 
governance and the inability to cope with globalisation processes. Technological 
complexity means that one has to take into account the fact that the new terrorists are 
distinguished by their ability to exploit sophisticated information and communication 
technologies such as electronic mail, the Internet, satellite television, mobile phones and 
so forth. 
CSCAP posits that there are four key measures to a regional counter-terror strategy: 
socio-economic, coercive, political and technical. Socio-economic measures are to 
address poverty and extreme socio-economic marginalisation. Coercive measures are 
strong legal enforcement measures such as freezing of assets and detentions of 
individuals suspected of complicity in terrorist plots. Political measures are those to 
address political and ideological grievances. Finally, technical measures target the 
functional capacity of the terrorists to plan, fund and implement their activities. The 
measures include intelligence sharing and exchange, tightening immigration and border 
controls and freezing and confiscating terrorist assets.  
These four measures can be further divided into two groups. The focal point of both 
socio-economic and political measures is to address the root causes. On the other hand, 
coercive and technical measures can be classified as operational measures. The 
measures to address the root causes are long-term in perspective and the effects thereof 
are rather intangible. Although it is possible to measure the changing level of poverty by 
comparing the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, one’s political grievances and 
religious extremity are elusive. Operational measures, on the other hand, are rather 
short-term in perspective and the effects of which are more tangible. 
While it is not the intention of this study to negate or underestimate the importance 
of socio-economic and political measures to address root causes of terrorism, this 
chapter stresses the second category, namely operational measures (coercive and 
technical measures). This is due to two reasons. First, not only are the impacts of 
socio-economic and political measures on the minds and behaviour of potential 
terrorists extremely difficult to observe, the direct causal linkages between the so-called 
root causes such as poverty and unemployment and terrorism are elusive. Second, if the 
linkage between poverty and terrorism is inconcrete, socio-economic measures are at 
best indirect means to countering terrorism. Given the limited space for the discussion 
of counter-terror cooperation in this chapter, emphasis needs to be given to direct 
measures rather than indirect measures.  
Some government leaders and scholars argue that poverty promotes terror because it 
breeds a sense of despair. “We fight against poverty,” President George W. Bush 
declared, “because hope is an answer to terror.”14 Samuel P. Huntington argues that 
“Governments that fail to meet the basic welfare and economic needs of their peoples 
and suppress their liberties generate violent opposition.”15 However, a closer look at 
their relationship suggests that the connection between poverty and terrorism is more 
nebulous than often suggested.16 Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova found that at least 
as great numbers of Palestinians with higher living standards as those unemployed 
supported attacks on Israeli civilian and military targets.17 Similarly, Nasra Hassan 
observed that none of the selected (i.e., trained and prepared) and non-selected suicide 
bombers interviewed “were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded or depressed. 
Many were middle class and…held paying jobs….Two were the sons of millionaires.”18 
The same profile applies to the hijackers of the September 11 attacks.19 Available 
evidence thus indicates that the relationship between poverty and terrorism is “indirect, 
complicated, and probably quite weak.”20 
Regardless of the relations between poverty, unemployment and political oppression 
on the one hand and terrorism on the other, the former are scourges that must be 
addressed. Moreover, falsely connecting these scourges to terrorism may be quite 
dangerous because, as Krueger and Maleckova suggest, it is possible that some groups 
deliberately engage in terrorist activities to raise their prospects of receiving aid.21 
On the other hand, coercive and technical measures which aim to strengthen the 
region’s law enforcement capabilities will tackle one of Southeast Asia’s serious 
vulnerabilities to terrorist penetration: weak law enforcement capability.22 Southeast 
Asia is characterised by its porousness of borders. Malaysia requires no visas for 
citizens of other Muslim countries whereas the Philippines has notorious loose 
immigration controls. 23  Both Indonesia and the Philippines had been labeled as 
non-cooperative in efforts to fight money laundering by the International Financial 
Action Task Force on Money Laundering.24  
Corruption is another serious problem in Southeast Asian countries. There are 
reported cases where military officials accepted a bribe to free detained terrorists or sold 
arms and munitions to terrorist groups. A Philippine military uprising in which 300 
soldiers seized a Manila shopping centre in July 2003 was triggered in protest to 
“unfettered corruption within the Philippines armed forces.”25 In particular, the rebels 
accused their superiors of selling weapons and ammunitions to Muslim guerrillas 
fighting for an Islamic state in Mindanao.26 Corruption is a challenge primarily for law 
enforcement. 
To enhance the region’s intelligence and law enforcement capabilities, CSCAP has 
raised several coercive and technical measures, which can be summarized as follows:  
 
1) Operational Cooperation 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Developing more effective information and intelligence storage and sharing 
arrangements; 
Improving the cooperation of law enforcement agencies;   
Tightening border and visa controls; 
Increasing public awareness of the nature and threat of regional terrorism to 
encourage an inclusive response; and 
Encouraging inter-jurisdictional joint law enforcement operations against 
targets of mutual concern. 
 
2) Terrorist Finance 
Ratifying the 1999 United Nations Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist 
Financing; 
Criminalising the financing of terrorist acts and organisations; 
Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets;   
Tightening money transfer regulations (e.g. requiring financial institutions to 
report suspicious transactions, improving money laundering requirements, 
strengthening customer requirements for wire transfers, etc.); and 
Assisting other country’s investigation of terrorist financing networks. 
 
3) Legal Cooperation 
Introducing compatible national counter-terrorist and transnational criminal 
laws to facilitate regional cooperation and 
Introducing bilateral and multilateral treaties and arrangements to facilitate 
extradition, mutual support in criminal matters, asset confiscation and the 
admissibility of evidence in other legal jurisdictions.27 
 
This chapter regards the listed cooperative measures as constituting the primary, though 
not exclusive, counter-terror strategy in East Asia. 
 
Counter-Terrorism Cooperation 
After the September 11, East Asian states, to a different extent, expressed support for 
and offered assistance to the American global campaign against terrorism. Both Japan 
and the ROK dispatched their troops to Afghanistan and the surrounding seas for 
logistical support. In Southeast Asia as well, key ASEAN countries such as the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia supported the United States, 
though the Indonesian support was limited.   
The United States is the most important counter-terrorism partner for Southeast 
Asian states in terms of military aid and training. The United States is modernising the 
military and police capability of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to 
help combat terrorism through the provision of military aid and equipments and 
counter-terror training. The Philippines and Thailand also conducted annual bilateral 
exercises with the United States, namely Balikatan and Cobra Gold respectively, which 
focused on counter-terrorism operations. The counter-terrorism exercises have been 
successful as in Balikatan 02 the Philippine and American forces killed over 
seventy-five percent of the Abu Sayyaf rebels including their leader Abu Sabayya.28  
Based on a bilateral treaty signed in 2002, Malaysia and the United States cooperate 
mainly on intelligence sharing and anti-money laundering. Because of U.S. 
congressional constraints on military-to-military cooperation, Washington has focused 
on the Indonesian police. The United States is funding and training a new counter-terror 
unit, which, when fully operational in 2005, will significantly strengthen the police’s 
ability to shoulder most of the burden in the war against terrorism in Indonesia.29 In 
addition, the United States is providing Indonesia with state-of-the-art weapons and 
communications equipment.30 
Within the region, terrorism has been addressed as a form of transnational crime. In 
the late 1990s, ASEAN ministers adopted two declarations on transnational crime—the 
ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime and the Manila Declaration on the 
Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime. The latter declaration led to the 
establishment of ASEAN Centre for Combating Transnational Crime in Manila. East 
Asian countries’ counter-terror efforts intensified after the September 11, especially 
after the Bali bombing in October 2002. In Southeast Asia, the Bali tragedy heralded an 
unprecedented cooperation among local and foreign law enforcement agencies.31 
 
Operational Cooperation 
Most cooperative efforts focus on intelligence sharing between law enforcement 
agencies. At the multilateral level, a number of initiatives have been taken to combat 
terrorism. Thailand hosted the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism 
(SEA-CAT) in March 2002. The SEA-CAT aimed to establish a regional coordination 
infrastructure for information sharing and exchange supporting a multilateral response 
to combat terrorism and other transnational crimes in the region.32 Four months later, 
Malaysia established the Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism 
(SEARCCT). The SEARCCT, which is open to any countries, is tasked with organising 
conferences and seminars as well as training for regional law enforcement agencies on 
counter-terrorism. Indonesia and Australia also agreed in February 2004 to set up a 
regional counter-terrorism training centre in Jakarta. The centre, Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Hassan Wirayuda said, would focus on “the software” or “the intelligence 
capability to detect.”33 
On the initiative of Manila, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines concluded the 
Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures 
in May 2002. Under the agreement, they will establish and standardise search and 
rescue operations, share airline passenger lists, set up hotlines, strengthen border 
controls and conduct joint counter-terrorism exercises. This tripartite agreement is later 
joined by Cambodia and Thailand.34 Indonesia also proposed the establishment of an 
ASEAN Security Community (ASC) to combat terrorism.  
On a larger scale, premised on the understanding that terrorism poses a direct 
challenge to APEC’s goals of free, open and prosperous economies, the APEC members 
established a Counter Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) to improve coordination so as to 
implement the Leaders’ Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth. In 
October 2003 the 21 APEC members issued APEC Leaders' Statement on Health 
Security to strengthen security against bio-terrorist attacks and also agreed to strengthen 
domestic export controls on man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) that could 
be used against passenger aircraft by terrorists. At the ARF first meeting after the 
September 11, the foreign ministers announced the establishment of an Inter-Sessional 
Group (ISG) on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime to be co-chaired by 
Malaysia and the United States.35 At the Tenth ARF meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia 
in June 2003, the ministers agreed to make “the fight against international terrorism and 
transnational crime a priority for current ARF cooperation” and adopted the ARF 
Statement on Cooperative Counter-Terrorist Action on Border Security.36 
Several agreements are also in place at the bilateral level. In an effort to intensify the 
capacity of customs authority, Malaysia signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) on the exchange of export declaration data with Indonesian and South Korean 
customs authorities.37 Japan cooperates with ASEAN countries by providing financial 
and technological assistance in six priority areas, namely immigration control, aviation 
security, customs, export control, police and law enforcement and terrorist financing.38 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia signed an MOU on 
Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism with Australia to enhance intelligence 
sharing and cooperation between their law enforcement officials.39 
Intensified cooperation on intelligence sharing bore fruit. Based on the information 
circulated from the Malaysian police, the Thai police arrested Hambali, the number two 
figure of JI who is dubbed as Asia’s Osama bin Laden, and his two lieutenants.40 A 
terrorism expert in the region observes that Hambali’s arrest was the most important 
accomplishment of regional counter-terrorism efforts to date, which, in his view, would 
be a heavy blow to JI.41  
 
Terrorist Finance 
A leading institution in this category of counter-terror cooperation would be the 
Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), which was established in February 
1997. The purpose of the APG is to facilitate the adoption, implementation and 
enforcement of internationally accepted standards against money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism.42 The APG currently comprises of 26 member jurisdictions 
including Japan, the ROK, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. 
In accordance with an Action Plan on Combating the Financing of Terrorism, which 
was approved at the Ninth APEC Finance Ministers Meeting in September 2002, many 
regional countries passed laws or took actions to freeze the financial assets of 
international terrorists. In Southeast Asia where many countries suffer from weak 
financial sectors, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
enacted an anti-money laundering law.43 
 
Counter-Terror Cooperation and Domestic Politics I: China, the Philippines and 
Thailand 
As the foregoing section suggests, countries in East Asia are cooperating steadfastly 
against terrorism. The progress is not only due to the fact that the eradication of 
terrorism is an interest to all, but also because cooperation serves other objectives that 
are not related to terrorism. Although national interests diverge, what is common to both 
Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian states is that they seek for the improved or 
strengthened relations with the United States. 
Both Japan and the ROK supported Washington primarily to consolidate their 
alliance relations with the United States, as the latter is their sole security guarantor 
against the DPRK. This is because despite the September 11, the nature of military 
confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and the attempt by the DPRK to possess nuclear 
weapons remain the primary security concerns in Northeast Asia.44  
For less developed countries such as the PRC and Southeast Asian states, 
counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States was seen as an opportunity to 
crack down on their own separatist movements within the country and thus to tighten 
domestic control. China confronts independence tendencies in Tibet and the western 
region of Xinjiang. China’s support for the American operation against terrorism was 
based on the assumption that it would help Beijing solve one of the oldest problems, 
namely quelling and controlling Xinjiang and Tibet—two vast regions that occupy 
about 30 percent of China’s land mass and are rich in mineral resources, oil and gas.45 
In January 2002, by claiming that Uighur separatist groups in Xinjiang “have seriously 
jeopardized the lives and property of” the Chinese people, the Information Office of 
China’s State Council issued a document entitled ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces 
Cannot Get Away With Impunity. The document highlighted the linkage of the Uighurs 
with Osama bin Laden and called for the recognition by the international community of 
the need to intensify measures against them.46 In short, America’s anti-terror war 
provided the Chinese government with an opportunity to stamp out the Uighur 
separatists under the banner of fighting terrorism, as several Chinese leaders wanted to 
“take advantage of the global anti-terrorist campaign to exterminate opposition and 
secessionist forces once and for all.”47  
The PRC also wished to accelerate the improvement in its relations with the United 
States that had deteriorated since the collision of an American EP-3 surveillance aircraft 
and a Chinese jet fighter in April 2001.48 Improved relationship with the United States 
serves to consolidate the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic political 
legitimacy in two ways. First, stable Sino-U.S. relations are vitally important in 
sustaining China’s economic growth as the United States is the largest market for the 
Chinese goods as well as the largest source of investment, capital and technology.49 As 
David Lampton notes, “The point of departure for Chinese strategic thinking is the need 
to maintain a set of external relationships and conditions that permit internal 
development to proceed with minimum feasible difficulty. Among external players, the 
United States has the greatest impact on that environment and hence on China’s 
prospects for development.”50 Continued economic growth is particularly important for 
Beijing in anticipation of worsening of already high unemployment rate as China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) required acceleration of economic 
reforms and opening of its market to foreign competition.51  
Secondly, against such a domestic socio-economic backdrop, the Sixteenth 
Community Party Congress was coming up in the fall of 2002 where a political 
leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao took place. The CCP wanted to 
make the leadership transition as smoothly as possible to attest to its internal stability. 
Internal stability consolidates domestic legitimacy. In short, Beijing sought to improve 
its ties with Washington so as to maximise its economic benefits that could flow from 
stable Sino-U.S. relations, which in turn can strengthen the Party’s domestic control and 
legitimacy.52 Because the performance of the Chinese Politburo is almost always 
judged from the perspective of how a policy will influence the prospects for domestic 
economic growth and socio-political stability, 53  Beijing’s concern for American 
hegemony played a rather minor role in China’s counter-terror cooperation policies 
behind domestic political considerations. 
In Southeast Asia, both the Philippines and Thailand sought to tighten domestic 
control with American help. Faced with an Islamic militant group called the Abu Sayyaf 
in the southern Philippines, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was keen on obtaining 
U.S. military and economic assistance. While military aid will increase the ability of 
Philippine armed forces to suppress the Abu Sayyaf, economic aid will help the country 
boost recovery from the economic slowdown.54 Arroyo’s strong support for U.S. global 
anti-terror campaign and her offer to give Americans access to Philippine air bases such 
as Clark and Subic Bay won her 100 million-dollar military aid, military equipments 
such as a C-130transport plane, helicopters and a patrol boat, munitions and training.55 
As mentioned earlier, Filipino-U.S. military exercise Balikatan 02 successfully killed a 
number of the Abu Sayyaf rebels. Washington has committed to continuously modernise 
Philippine military capability to help combat terrorism.56  
Similarly, Thai support for the American global anti-terrorism campaign was 
motivated partly by its desire to tighten domestic control. The government of Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra suppresses local movements that have challenged 
Thailand’s political and social hold under the banner of fighting terrorism.57 
 
Counter-Terror Cooperation and Domestic Politics II: Malaysia and Indonesia  
This section compares the responses of Malaysia and Indonesia to terrorism. While both 
of these countries have similar ethnic and religious demographics—the majority of the 
people are Malays and Islam is the majority religion, the attitudes of Malaysia and 
Indonesia toward clamping down on terrorism are remarkably different, in fact opposite. 
Why do their responses differ? What accounts for such differences? Answers to these 
questions lie in domestic politics. In particular, bureaucratic politics and balance of 
power between political parties are the two influential domestic factors. These factors 
worked favourably on the Malaysian government while they initially had negative 
impacts on the Indonesian government. 
 
Malaysia 
While Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad deplored the terrorist attacks on 
11 September 2001, he openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the American-led 
military strike against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. Mahathir, however, warned 
hard-line Islamist parties and groups in Malaysia not to extend their support to Osama 
bin Laden or the Taliban and stated that the Malaysian government would not “tolerate 
anyone who supports violence and will act against these irresponsible people or anyone 
who backs terrorism.”58  
A much harsher criticism of the United States came from Mahathir’s main 
opposition party, the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS). While Prime Minister Mahathir 
warned that the attack on Afghanistan should not be regarded as an attack on the 
Muslim world, the PAS leaders claimed that the military strike was clearly an attack on 
Islam. For instance, PAS President Fadzil Mohd Noor called the Americans war 
criminals and stated that “all Muslims must oppose these criminals—this time, there is 
no denying a call for Jihad.”59 On 10 October 2001, PAS declared a jihad against the 
United States and its coalition partners and allowed PAS members to join and support 
the Taliban.60 PAS supporters also made a massive demonstration in Kuala Lumpur to 
show their support for PAS leaders, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.61  
PAS’s declaration of a jihad and its show of support for the Taliban had a negative 
impact on the perception not only domestic constituents but also international business 
communities had of PAS. 62  Already concerned about the political instability of 
Southeast Asia, foreign investors became even more worried about the safety of their 
investments in Malaysia. By publicly voicing its stand in favour of Osama bin Laden 
and the Taliban, PAS alienated itself from vast sections of the local and international 
community, pushed itself to the margins of the local political scene.63  
Observing such political development in which PAS was losing its domestic 
popularity, President Mahathir exploited the situation. By characterising PAS as Islamic 
radicals and presenting himself as the face of moderate Muslims, Mahathir successfully 
discredited PAS and gained support for his policies vis-à-vis the local Islamist 
opposition and, as a result, Malaysia’s crackdown on Islamic terrorist cells and 
networks.64 In his speech before Asia Society in February 2002, Mahathir stressed the 
need to act against potential terrorists in Malaysia.65  
In the case of Malaysia, PAS’s weakened domestic support and the consequently 
strengthened popularity of Mahathir’s Barison Nasional made the Mahathir 
administration easier to take counter-terror measures with the United States and the 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Indonesia 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri was the first Muslim leader in Asia to 
denounce the September 11 attacks and to express support for U.S.-led campaign 
against terrorism. Indonesia had interests in supporting the United States to resume 
Indonesian-U.S. military relations. The American war on terrorism was an opportunity 
for Megawati to stamp out Indonesia’s radical Islamic groups and separatists in such 
places as Ache and Irian Jaya. Megawati knows that the United States can be of great 
assistance in fighting against them. One of the major strategic interests of Indonesia 
from the United States in the war on terrorism was to get military assistance and 
training.66 Moreover, Megawati also wanted America’s economic aid to rebuild the 
Indonesian economy that had been shattered by the Asian financial crisis. 
In contrast to Malaysia’s Mahathir, however, Megawati faced a strong backlash 
from several hardline Muslim communities. Several Islamic groups began to stage 
protests on the streets of Jakarta and other cities and expressed their anger and 
displeasure at President Megawati’s visit to Washington as well as America’s accusation 
that Osama bin Laden masterminded the September 11 attacks. For example, Jafar 
Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad, stated that Megawati’s visit to the United 
States “clearly ignored the feeling of the um’mah (Islamic community)” and it “can be 
seen as a form of support by Megawati for America’s plan to attack Afghanistan.”67  
Anti-American protests intensified after the United States attacked Afghanistan and 
began to challenge the Megawati presidency.68 The Indonesian government was forced 
to issue a six-point statement to soothe anti-government demonstrations. Although the 
statement expressed the Indonesian government’s concern about the U.S.-led military 
strikes against the Taliban, it angered many radical groups in Indonesia because it was 
regarded as being short of criticizing the U.S. military campaign and proclaiming 
support for Washington.69 The protests against Megawati further intensified, and the 
Megawati government finally bowed to the domestic pressure with its sharp criticism on 
the United States.70 Megawati declared that it was unacceptable that someone attack 
people or another country for whatever reason. Megawati’s speech was widely seen in 
Indonesia and abroad as a significant departure from Indonesia’s previous posture on 
the issue.71  
Furthermore, as many Indonesians believed that foreign allegations that Indonesia 
was a hotbed for terrorists were an American attempt to discredit the Islamic world, 
Megawati denied the existence of terrorist groups and possible links between 
Indonesian radical groups and international terrorist networks in the country. As a result, 
Indonesia’s own counter-terror measures as well as its cooperation with the 
neighbouring countries remained minimal. Jakarta’s attitude also frustrated its ASEAN 
partners which warned Indonesia not to underestimate the security implications of 
international terrorism.72 
Megawati’s backtracked position and her consequent lack of leadership on the issue 
of terrorism can best be explained by the bureaucratic politics model. For a leader of the 
world’s largest Muslim country—Muslims account for over eighty-seven percent of 
Indonesia’s population, 73  Islamic support is critically important to retain his/her 
position. Given that the next presidential election is to take place in April 2004, it is in 
Megawati’s personal interests not to alienate Muslim constituents. 
Support from the Muslim communities is particularly important for President 
Megawati also because she became Indonesia’s fourth president as a result of significant 
support from the Islamic parties following the fall of her predecessor President 
Abdurrhman Wahid. To retain Islamic support to avoid the same mistake Wahid made, 
Megawati formed a coalition with the largest Islamic party, the United Development 
Party (PPP), and chose its chairman, Hamzah Haz, as Vice President and other Islamic 
figures as ministers. Haz and other Muslim leaders were critical of U.S. military 
activities in Afghanistan and Megawati for supporting the United States. Haz has 
frequently appealed to anti-U.S. sentiments to win public support, the politicking of 
which tended to undermine the government’s anti-terrorist efforts.74 The speaker of the 
Indonesian Parliament, too, once warned Megawati not to become the puppet of U.S. 
policy.75 Megawati seemed to realize that confrontation with her coalition partners 
would jeopardize her political life since her position would remain secure only as long 
as she was able to sustain her political support of Islamic parties within the parliament.76  
The Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 had a significant impact on Indonesia’s 
attitude toward terrorism as the blast brought home the reality of international terrorism 
and proved that the country was not immune from it. It forced the Indonesian 
government to acknowledge for the first time Indonesian ties with the al-Qaeda terrorist 
network. Within a week, Megawati issued an anti-terror decree—which had been stalled 
in the Parliament for months—that grants police new powers to detain suspected 
terrorists without trial and provides the death penalty for convicted terrorists.77 The 
power is already enacted in the Internal Security Acts in Malaysian and Singapore but 
had been dismissed in Indonesia.78 The Megawati government also quickly welcomed 
foreign assistance in the investigation. 
The Bali bombing changed public opinion gradually and subsequently the balance 
of power between Megawati and Haz. Initially, about seventy percent of Indonesians 
reportedly believed that the bombing was the work of the CIA which they thought 
wished to strengthen ties with the Indonesian military and take a tougher stance against 
terrorism.79 However, the arrest of Abubakar Ba’asyir, the leader of Jemaah Islamiah 
(JI), the group alleged to be responsible for the Bali bombing, and the well-publicized 
accusations of terrorism against him gradually led the Indonesian public to believe that 
JI was responsible for the bombing in Bali.80  
Also, Indonesia’s two largest and most important Muslim groups—Nahdlatul Ulama 
and Muhammadiyah—who represent the majority of Indonesians have turned their 
attitudes against radical Islamic groups and turned into supporting the Megawati 
government. This could represent the mobilization of Indonesia’s moderate Muslim 
majority against radical visions of Islam.81  
Bali triggered a significant change in the political weight in Indonesia as the blast 
severely tarnished the image of Megawati’s political rivals such as Hamzah Haz, who 
had declared before the Bali that all the claims of the existence of terrorist networks in 
Indonesia were American propaganda.82 Haz has swiftly retreated from his earlier 
statements denying any terrorist threat within the country.83 The Bali blast has tipped 
the balance of power in favour of the moderate political elite and mainstream Muslim 
organizations.84 As a result, President Megawati has increasingly felt able to publicly 
criticize and arrest members of radicalized groups within Indonesia.85 
It should be noted, however, that while the changes in political equation in Indonesia 
emboldened the Megawati government to pursue counter-terrorism measures with the 
United States and the states in the region more aggressively, the changes did not bring 
about a volte-face. With presidential elections rear at hand, Megawati and other 
Indonesian leaders are reluctant to pursue policies that may prove unpopular to Muslim 
constituents, though they are publicly committed to the crackdown on terror.86 As 
former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas concedes, “We still don’t seem to be fully unified in 
our perception of terrorism.”87 Nonetheless, the Malaysian and Indonesian experience 
illustrates that domestic political factors such as bureaucratic politics and the balance of 
power between political parties influence the progress of international cooperation in 
the region. 
 
Conclusions 
Hegemony/Balance of Power 
The balance of power factor is observed in Sino-American relations. One scholar argues 
that the PRC has perceived the region’s multilateral security cooperation arrangement 
namely the ARF as a vehicle for promoting multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific to counter 
America’s unipolar status in the post-Cold War world.88 In this line of argument, one 
should expect that Beijing’s attitude toward cooperation is influenced by its concern for 
U.S. hegemony in the region. In short, China would be willing to cooperate if 
cooperation is detrimental to U.S. hegemony while it would be unwilling if cooperation 
is constructive to American hegemony. 
The United States has gained greater strategic influence in Central Asia, South Asia 
and Southeast Asia at China’s expense after 11 September. Russia endorsed the U.S. 
campaign in Afghanistan and authorised intelligence sharing as well as American 
overflights of Russian airspace; Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan provided access 
to military bases and facilities to the United States; Pakistan also granted military bases 
at Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbandhin and Shamsi and allowed U.S. intelligence agencies to 
set up listening posts in Pakistan’s north bordering Xinjiang and Tibet to monitor 
military activity there; and India forged closer ties with Washington.89 In Southeast 
Asia, the United States successfully strengthened its bilateral ties. For example, the 
Philippines revitalised security ties with the United States by providing military bases 
and hosted U.S. counter-terrorism campaigns in the southern Philippines. The United 
States also increased its forces at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base, formed strategic ties 
with Indonesia and strengthened relations with Malaysia and Thailand.  
Observing the increased U.S. strategic leverage, some Chinese strategists expressed 
concern that Washington was making progress in an ongoing effort to contain and 
encircle China.90 President Jiang Zemin himself has reportedly expressed his anxiety 
that Washington was extending U.S. “hegemonism” and establishing a foothold in 
China’s southwest backyard.91  
Despite such Chinese concerns and the following Chinese attempt to balance the 
United States by improving its relations with Southeast Asian countries and India,92 
China’s balancing behaviour is limited. As Denny Roy observes, “balancing against the 
United States is not the driving principle of Chinese security policy.”93 Beijing neither 
openly confronted such U.S. move nor rallied an anti-American global 
counter-terrorism campaign. On the contrary, the PRC has initiated counter-terrorism 
cooperation with the United States, mainly on intelligence sharing, terrorist financing 
and anti-money laundering.  
At the Fifteenth session of the China-U.S. Joint Economic Committee (JEC) in 
September 2002, China and the United States pledged to reinvigorate efforts to combat 
the financing of terrorism and money laundering.94 They established a medium- and 
long-term counter-terror cooperation mechanism. Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson stressed that both sides viewed the strengthening of China-U.S. 
counter-terrorism cooperation as conductive to the advancement of international 
anti-terrorism activities and of the bilateral relationship.95 Also, China formally joined 
the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in July 2003. The aim of the CSI, which was 
developed by U.S. Customs in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, is to 
protect containerized shipping from exploitation by terrorists. Under the Initiative, 
Chinese and American customs officials work together at the ports of Shanghai and 
Shenzhen screening sea containers deemed high risk that are destined for U.S. ports. 
China became the sixth Asian country to sign the CSI after Singapore, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Rather than balancing, the PRC opted to 
improve Sino-American relations through bilateral cooperation. In short, Beijing’s 
concern about U.S. hegemony in the region is not so influential as to prevent Chinese 
counter-terrorism cooperation.  
 
Leadership 
Strong American leadership is a double-edged sword in the region. In the Philippines 
and Thailand, U.S. leadership is an important factor facilitating counter-terror 
cooperation. But in Indonesia and Malaysia American leadership has a negative effect 
on their policies. Indonesians are not pleased with the U.S.-led campaign against 
terrorism because they think that the United States generally associates terror with Islam 
so as to weaken Islam.96 Anti- Americanism in Indonesia makes it difficult for the 
Megawati government to unequivocally support U.S. counter-terrorism campaign. 
Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir has also voiced his displeasure with the 
United States. Needless to say, who provides leadership is as important as the existence 
or absence of leadership since it strongly influences the progress of cooperation. 
The importance of leadership is also evident in Indonesia. Despite insistent 
warnings from the United States and the neighbouring countries, Megawati could not 
take immediate action because her position as president stood on domestic Muslim 
support. Since terrorism is an issue closely associated with Islam, Megawati failed to act 
decisively for fear of alienating Muslim supporters and constituents. Thus, it was 
Megawati’s weak leadership that deferred counter-terrorism actions in Indonesia.97 
 
Domestic Politics 
Several domestic political factors appear influential in the progress of security 
cooperation. In some cases, rather than constraining inter-state cooperation, domestic 
political factors such as leaders’ desire to tighten domestic control and strengthen their 
legitimacy worked as a facilitator of cooperation in countries like China, the Philippines 
and Thailand. The comparison of Indonesia and Malaysia clearly illustrated that the 
impacts of domestic politics are contextual. The balance of power between political 
parties acted favourably for Mahathir while it worked negatively for Megawati until the 
Bali bombing in October 2002. When inter-state cooperation reinforces government 
legitimacy states are willing to cooperate while they are reluctant when government 
legitimacy is at stake.   
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